SENIOR STAFF WRITER: JOHN KERINS
There is perhaps no greater symbol of NBA strategic maneuvering than a blockbuster trade. However, behind the fireworks lie significant questions about labor rights in a highly structured industry: Do trades infringe upon an athlete’s freedom of movement? Can professional athletes—as opposed to other entertainment fields—be subject to involuntary relocation without violating labor protections? And what can the recent National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) settlement and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) enforcement mechanisms teach us about labor agency and contract enforcement? This post examines these questions through the lens of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or “the Act”), comparing athletes to other workers and addressing whether unfair labor practice (ULP) claims could provide legal recourse, in light of the June 6th, 2025, approved settlement between the NCAA and current and former Division 1 student-athletes.
I. Freedom of Movement: Athletes vs. Entertainers
Unlike most high-level professionals—actors, musicians, CEOs—NBA players can be unwillingly traded at any time under the standard collective bargaining agreement (CBA). An NBA trade is a forced relocation uncharacteristic of voluntary labor markets. In contrast, actors and musicians may reject undesirable projects without automatic assignment from a union-negotiated framework.
The result is an enforced rigidity rarely seen elsewhere in employment: one arranged by the NBA’s structural design, not by individual agency. Under the NLRA, collectively-bargained employees generally retain the right to refuse transfers or resign if compelled into intolerable change—choices unavailable to most NBA players without specific contractual protections. Additionally, the NBA’s practice of categorizing certain workers as independent contractors may constitute misclassification under the NLRA and state labor laws, potentially interfering with employees’ rights under the NLRA and, in some circumstances, amounting to an unfair labor practice.
II. From College Courtrooms to Pro Arenas
The NCAA’s recently approved $2.8 billion House v. NCA settlement—a response to antitrust claims surrounding Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) restrictions for Division 1 athletes post-2016—marks a watershed moment in labor rights.[1] It underscores the shifting legal landscape for worker autonomy in amateur and professional entertainment industries. The NLRB’s designation of Division I athletes as statutory employees—as in the Dartmouth decision—further challenges the notion that “student-athletes,” or any entertainment industry laborer, are exempt from labor law.[2]
In the professional realm, the NBA CBA operates under a recognized union structure but fundamentally excludes strategic agency: players are subject to trade provisions without meaningful recourse. In contrast, amateurs now have recourse via ULP charges or antitrust claims. In addition to the rapidly changing agency landscape, where young prospects are now permitted to contract with representatives when these prospects are high school teenagers still playing in the AAU circuit[ALS1] [JK2] [3], it is now easier to be represented as an amateur entertainer rather than a professional, industrial member of a multi-billion-dollar entertainment industry. Integrally, this reversal raises the question—if amateurs are protected, why are professionals not?
III. NLRA Remedies: Pathways to Change
Despite league-shielded trade power, Section 7 of the NLRA still guarantees concerted activities, that includes advocacy for improved working conditions[4] and Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employer interference with such rights.[5] If NBA players, through the National Basketball Players’ Association (NBPA), or other groups, publicly criticize trade policy or demand consent rights, the NBA might risk a ULP allegation.
However, the NBPA has been held to effectively negotiate trade rules. So long as terms are collectively bargained, courts view them as protected by the nonstatutory labor exemption to antitrust law.[6] This may prove challenging to argue from the side of the NBPA; however, when there is a constitutional argument to be made, the courts have previously held that collective bargaining agreements can be ignored or even voided.[7]
One possible solution would be to amend the standard rookie contract that each draft-eligible member of the NCAA (or other outside basketball circuits at the amateur level, such as the G League) must sign to participate in the draft process. This would contain an explicit stipulation that, for the duration of the rookie contract, the player consents to potential trade at any time. While this is currently an implicit stipulation, there is not necessarily any legal ground by which to support this enterprise; other professional entertainers can decline drastic shifts in labor conditions, or at the very least gain union representation in court, and amateur athletes are now protected under the common law from unfair collegiate conspiracy to limit amateur freedoms. Unfortunately, this will require an amendment to the CBA, which is not scheduled to be reconsidered until after the 2029–2030 NBA season.
In the interim, no-trade clauses (NTCs) offer a discrete and immediate contractual remedy. When violated, the injured player may pursue breach of contract—a remedy unavailable to most players now, despite being subject to involuntary mobilization.
IV. Applying It to Dončić
Luka Dončić’s trade to the Lakers—which did not include a no-trade clause—placed him in the center of multiple labor and league considerations:
- Involuntary Mobilization: Dončić was moved without consent—a move consistent with CBA terms but anomalous when compared to other employment frameworks.
- NLRA Status: NBA players have statutory rights but are disfranchised in trade mechanisms. A targeted concerted campaign for trade consent, if coordinated with the NBPA, could be protected activity under NLRA §§ 7–8.
- Remedy Gaps: Absent a no-trade clause, Dončić lacks legal recourse unless the union changes its bargaining position. Additionally, due to the nature of the CBA, there is no civil remedy at hand for him, either, leaving the only court the court of public opinion.
V. Broader Implications
This issue exposes a tension in labor law: When are elite workers treated as free agents, and when as property? The collegiate shift toward employment rights and transparency contrasts sharply with the NBA’s model—one of elite income, but restricted right and a confluence of individual rights and property rights.
If pro athletes—through their union—gathered enough leverage to challenge involuntary transfers, courts could consider this legitimate labor protections enforcement. It may spark a needed paradigm shift: from unassailable trade norms to enhanced player consent rights.
VI. Conclusion
The Dončić trade is legally permissible under current NBA-CBA rules. Still, scrutinized through labor law and NLRA frameworks, it underscores significant fairness and autonomy concerns. By positioning trade refusal as concerted rights advocacy, players and the NBPA may initiate ULP-based enforcement or CBA reform.
Like college athletes asserting newfound agency, NBA players could reassert the principle that freedom of movement—central to labor fairness—should not be forfeited simply because they wear a uniform.
[1] See House v. NCAA, No. 4:20-cv-03919 (N.D. Cal., filed June 15, 2020; settlement awarded June 6, 2025).
[2] See Region 1 of the NLRB, Decision and Direction of Election, Trustees of Dartmouth College, Case 01-RC-325633 (Feb. 5, 2024).
[3] The AAU Circuit, a collection of amateur teams, tournaments, players, and their sponsors, is the primary way for young basketball players to be recruited to the college sports scene (and, in some extreme cases, directly to the professional’s developmental G League).
[4] See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
[5] See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
[6] See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237–39 (1996).
[7] See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., 585 U.S. 878, 895 (2018) (holding that Constitutional violations supersede collective bargaining terms or agreements).
The Labor and Employment Law Society Brief 